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ENHANCING THE SECURITY BEHIND
MUNICIPAL OBLIGATIONS: FLUSHING AND
U.S. TRUST LEAD THE WAY
Kenneth W. Bond*
I. Introduction
When bond counsel' render their legal opinion approving the issu-
ance and delivery of a municipal obligation,' one of the opinions
traditionally expressed is that the obligation is "valid and legally
binding according to its terms." Significant, here, are the words
"valid" and "binding."
The validity of a municipal obligation can usually be determined
by straightforward observation. Bond counsel must be satisfied that
(1) the issuer has statutory and sometimes constitutional authority
to borrow and incur indebtedness,3 (2) the funds borrowed are to be
used for a public purpose,4 and (3) the issuer has complied with the
preconditions to issuing debt obligations and incurring indebted-
ness .
5
* B.A..The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., Hastings College of the Law, University of
California; LL. M., New York University. Member of the Florida and New York Bars. Mem-
ber of the Committee on the City of New York, New York County Lawyers' Association. Mr.
Bond is associated with the firm of Reed, McCarthy & Giordano, New York, New York. Mr.
Bond acknowledges his appreciation to Gerard Giordano, Esq., for his thoughtful comments
and advice in preparing this Article.
1. Bond counsel are attorneys who specialize in the law of municipal finance. Their clients
are municipalities, states and other public bodies which issue debt obligations. Their opinion
that a municipal obligation is legal, valid and binding, and that the interest thereon is exempt
from income taxation, is usually required by purchasers and underwriters at the time the
obligations are delivered.
2. The term "municipal obligation" or "debt obligation" hereinafter refers to all types of
obligations customarily issued by a state, such as bonds, bond anticipation notes, revenue
anticipation notes, and tax anticipation notes. For a thorough discussion on the various types
of municipal obligations, see Greenberg, Municipal Securities: Some Basic Principles and
Practices, 9 Urb. Law. 338 (1977). An exhaustive discussion of "moral obligation" bonds is
found in Griffith, "Moral Obligation" Bonds: Illusion or Security?, 8 Urb. Law. 54 (1976).
For a judicial definition of the term "general obligation," see Port of New York Authority v.
Baker, Watts & Co. 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also 15 McQuIIuN MUN. CORP. §§
43.05-43.12 (3d ed. 1970).
3. Andrello v. Dulan, 49 Misc. 2d 17, 266 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1966).
4. Murphy v. Erie County, 28 N.Y.2d 80, 268 N.E.2d 771, 320 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1971).
5. When an issuer of municipal obligations fails to comply with a precondition to incur-
ring debt (e.g., failing to publish a notice of sale), and yet a recital of compliance with
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The more subtle question in this area revolves around the mean-
ing of the phrase "binding according to its terms." A municipal
obligation is a form of contract, and as such, is subject to laws
affecting creditors' rights. In recent years, contract terms have be-
come susceptible to modification, a source of concern to bond coun-
sel and investors alike.'
One of the terms which binds the issuer of a municipal obligation
to pay principal and interest punctually is the pledge of the issuer's
"faith and credit" (in the case of a general obligation),7 or the pledge
of specific revenues derived from the project financed with bond
proceeds (in the case of a revenue bond).' Practitioners in the law
of municipal finance do not consider these pledges of security to be
absolute, and the case law in the area has generally confirmed their
belief. For example, where the taxing power of a municipality was
preconditions appears on the obligations, the issuer will be prevented from impugning the
validity of the obligation, as long as it had legal authority to issue the obligation initially.
This is known as the doctrine of estoppel by recital. See Chaffee County v. Potter, 142 U.S.
355 (1892); Anthony v. County of Jasper, 101 U.S. 693 (1879). In Wein v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d
498, 362 N.E.2d 587, 393 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1977), the court of appeals aptly pointed out that
without the estoppel by recital rule, municipal obligations would become speculative invest-
ments and the investor could not rely on the patent authority of the issuer to issue debt
obligations. The rule of estoppel by recital is codified in sections 80.00 through 84.00 of the
New York Local Finance Law. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW. §§ 80.00 - 84.00 (McKinney 1968). In
addition, Section 8-202(2)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code states that where there is
"substantial compliance" with preconditions, a good faith bona fide purchaser for considera-
tion without notice of defects in preconditions is protected against attacks on validity. U.C.C.
§ 8-202(2)(b) (1972); U.C.C. § 8-202(2)(b) (McKinney 1964).
6. Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-418 (Cum. Supp. 1977), pro-
vides for an adjustment of all municipal obligations upon the voluntary filing of a petition in
bankruptcy in a federal court. The 1976 amendments contain new provisions on classification
of creditors' claims, treatment of set-off claims by creditors, and rejection of executory con-
tracts and leases. Id. at §§ 408(b), 404(g), 408(c). See Bond, Municipal Bankruptcy Under
the 1976 Amendments to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1 (1976).
7. The pledge of "faith and credit" is essentially a pledge of the municipality's taxing
power for the benefit of holders of general obligations. Indeed, in New York, a municipality
may not issue its general obligations without pledging its "faith and credit". See Tierney v.
Cohen, 268 N.Y. 464, 198 N.E. 225 (1935). See also N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 100 (McKinney
1968).
8. In the case of revenue bonds, specific revenues or assets of the enterprise receiving bond
proceeds are pledged to support the payment of principal and interest. If the enterprise fails,
the bondholder must stand in line with other general creditors in bankruptcy proceedings,
.unless he is secured by some additional revenues or assets. For example, the payment of
revenue bonds of a political subdivision may be guaranteed by the pledge of the "faith and
credit" of the state. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7003(b) (1974); see also 15 MCQUILLIN
MUN. CORP. § 4311 (3d ed. 1970).
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fiscally exhausted, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a munici-
pality is permitted, under state law, to adjust its general obligation
indebtedness to preserve its taxing power? Likewise, where the pub-
lic interest was best served by modifying an agreement between the
state and a purchaser of its real property, a modification, if reason-
able and necessary, has been held not to violate the contract clause
of the United States Constitution."0
However, two recent cases, Flushing National Bank v. Municipal
Assistance Corp.," ("Flushing"), and United States Trust Co. of
New York v. New Jersey" ("U.S. Trust"), suggest that the pledge
of security to the holders of municipal obligations is something
more than a mere promise to pay principal and interest assuming
tax or enterprise revenues are presently available or could be
raised. The holdings of these cases clearly point to a new judicial
direction favoring strict construction of the terms binding the issuer
to the obligation holders. The general result of these cases is to
enhance substantially an obligation holder's creditor interest in
municipal obligations against competing claims for public funds.
II. Flushing and U.S. Trust: A Brief Synopsis
A. Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp.
In the Flushing case, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the pledge of "faith and credit" in short-term notes of the City of
New York (the "City") meant that the City was bound to pay the
notes when due, regardless of a real or imagined financial emer-
gency. 3 The court declared that the New York City Emergency
Moratorium Act 4 violated the "faith and credit" provisions of the
New York State Constitution." The Act had prevented the holders
9. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
10. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
11. 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
12. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
13. 40 N.Y.2d at 735, .358 N.E.2d at 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
14. 1975 N.Y. Laws, chs. 874, 875.
15. Article VIII, section 2 of the New York Constitution requires that no municipality may
contract indebtedness unless it shall have pledged its "faith and credit" for the payment of
principal and interest, and further provides that if appropriations are insufficient to make
such payment' i lien attaches on the "first revenues" of the municipality.
Plaintiffs, in their Flushing reply brief, contended that the City's 1975-1976 real estate tax
revenues were about $3 billion, and thus there were enough funds available on the "first
revenue" theory to redeem the $1 billion of Moratorium-tainted short-term notes. Reply Brief
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of short-term notes who refused to exchange them for Municipal
Assistance Corporation 8 ("MAC") bonds to bring an action to en-
force their payment for three years. 7 The elimination of all reme-
dies, and thus of all rights, rendered worthless the constitutional
pledge of "faith and credit" made when the notes were issued."8
The court's decision in the Flushing case is a considerable depar-
ture from prior case law, particularly from the U.S. Supreme Court
case of Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park. '9 Faitoute
and its progency" had established the rule that "faith and credit"
merely meant that a municipality was bound to exercise its good
faith, or use its best efforts, to apply its credit-traditionally its
power to levy and collect taxes-to pay principal and interest on its
debt obligations. The pledge of "faith and credit" under the
Faitoute rationale was not a guarantee that the City of Asbury Park
would pay its indebtedness in times such as the Great Depression
when resort to the taxing power would be futile.' In Faitoute the
Supreme Court approved a scheme which discharged existing in-
for Plaintiff-Appellant at 46, Flushing Nat'l. Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d
731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). Defendant Emergency Financial Control Board
("EFCB") contended in its brief that the constitutional history of the "first revenues" lan-
guage did not mean that Article VIII mandates an immediate appropriation from available
revenues to meet debt service. Brief for Defendant-Appellee EFCB at 15, Flushing Nat'l.
Bank v. MAC, 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
The Municipal Assistance Corporation, N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 3033, 3036-38 (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1977) was created as a public benefit corporation to provide funds for the City
by issuing its own bonds and notes. The amount of the bonds and notes issued may not exceed
$5.25 billion; nor may the bonds and notes exceed a maximum, maturity of 20 years. The
sources of payment for MAC bonds are (1) appropriations from the New York State legisla-
ture, (2) sale taxes collected from the City, and (3) the City's stock transfer tax. MAC bonds
are not secured by any pledges of "faith and credit," and as such are neither general obliga-
tions nor revenue bonds. Instead, they most nearly resemble "moral obligation" bonds.
17. 40 N.Y.2d at 738, 358 N.E.2d at 853, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
18. Id. at 736, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
19. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
20. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); East New York Savings
Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); United States Trust Co. of New York v. State, 134 N.J.
Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (1975); Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 52 App.
Div. 2d 84, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1976).
21. The Supreme Court in Faitoute characterized a municipal obligation as an
"unsecured . . . security" which is "merely a draft on the good faith of a municipality in
exercising its taxing power." In times of financial hardship, the Court stated that "the notion
that a city has unlimited taxing power is, of course, an illusion. . . . A city cannot be taken
over and operated for the benefit of its creditors, nor can its creditors take over the taxing
power." 316 U.S. at 509.
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debtedness and substituted for it new indebtedness payable over a
longer period of time in order to save "the resources of the munici-
pality . . . the taxes which [could] alone . ..meet the outstand-
ing claims."22
The court of appeals in Flushing, interpreting the strictures of
the New York Constitution as mandatory and inviolate of legislative
adjustment, made several determinations at variance with the con-
ception of "faith and credit" espoused in Faitoute.
First, the court adopted the plaintiff's interpretation of "faith and
credit." It declared that the pledge is not merely a commitment of
the municipality to use good faith in exercising its taxing power, but
rather is a continuing commitment to make payment when due
until the last principal maturity is redeemed.23
Second, the court held that the source of repayment funds need
not be only tax revenues, but may include all revenues which can
be generated in good faith from the municipality's "general revenue
powers." 24 While the court's suggestion that a municipality's credit
includes all its revenues and not merely its taxing power may be a
novel interpretation of the "faith and credit" pledge, the authority
for the court's determination is clearly derived from the "first reve-
nues" language of Article VIII, section 2 of the New York Constitu-
tion." Defendants, foreseeing this possible interpretation, argued
that application of all the City's revenues to satisfy the
Moratorium-tainted short-term obligations would bring collapse
upon the financially embarrassed City.2" However, the argument
22. Id. at 512. In the Supreme Court's analysis, under the State of New Jersey's bank-
ruptcy power, the State could regulate its political subdivision's fiscal affairs with a plan of
composition approved by a state bankruptcy court. Id. at 508, citing United States v. Bekins,
304 U.S. 327 (1938).
23. 40 N.Y.2d at 735, 358 N.E.2d at 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (1976). In an analysis contrary
to the Faitoute case, the court of appeals explained that a "constitutional prescription of a
pledge of faith and credit is designed . . . to protect rights vulnerable in the event of difficult
economic circumstances." Id. at 736, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26. It felt that "the
presence of the specific remedy against a defaulting municipality, beyond the generality of
the faith and credit clause, is conclusive that the Constitution permits no escape for the
municipality from performing its obligations. . . .The only practical significance of a pledge
of faith and credit with respect to an indebtedness must be in relation to its payments here
on earth and on its due day." Id. at 738-39, 358 N.E.2d at 853-54, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 277-28.
24. Id. at 738, 358 N.E.2d at 853, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
25. See note 15 supra.
26. Brief for Defendant Appellee, at 7, Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). The brief stated "if the
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was proven groundless since subsequent attempts to devise a repay-
ment plan for holders of the affected short-term obligations were
successful."
Third, the court concluded that the police power may not be used
to override the New York State Constitution, even in an alleged
financial emergency. 8
By its resort to the New York Constitution to define the applica-
tion of the "faith and credit" pledge, the court of appeals avoided
a determination of whether the Moratorium Act constituted an im-
pairment of the City's obligation under the contract clause 29 of the
United States Constitution ° The two lower courts in the Flushing
case had held there was no such impairment.' The court also
avoided a determination of what circumstances might constitute a
"financial emergency" sufficient to justify exercise of the police
power to modify the "faith and credit" pledge. Thus, while the
Flushing case breathes new power into the "faith and credit" pledge
in a municipality's general obligations in New York, and presuma-
bly in other states whose constitutions may contain similar wording,
the decision may be of little precedential value in other states where
the "faith and credit" pledge is merely statutory.2 For those states,
[Moratorium] Act is held invalid, it is no exaggeration but a simple statement of fact that
the consequences would be disasterous for the City and its inhabitants as well as for the State
of New York." Id.
27. The City devised a plan for repayment of the Moratorium-tainted notes by aggregat-
ing revenues from several sources. The plan was quickly approved by.the.EFCB. The Daily
Bond Buyer of March 11, 1977 reported that the EFCB approved the City's plan to redeem
approximately $983 million short-term notes from the following sources of revenues: (1) $410
million from the sale of housing project mortgages, (2) $50 million from the City's Education
Construction Fund as a repayment of a loan from the City, (3) $90 million from a 5-year
stretchout of MAC bonds held by the City pension funds, (4) $250 to $300 million from an
exchange offer of MAC bonds, (5) $109 million from three sinking funds or debt reserve funds,
and (6) $57 million from the City's cash flow due to advance receipt of certain state and
federal aid. The Daily Bond Buyer, March 11, 1977 at 1, col. 1.
28. 40 N.Y.2d at 740, 358 N.E.2d at 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
29. "No State shall. . . pass any. . .Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
30. The court of appeals stated: "Thus, the Moratorium Act, by depriving short-term
noteholders of judicial remedies for at least three years, makes meaningless the verbal pledge
of faith and credit. On this view the Federal questions need not be reached." 40 N.Y.2d at
732-33, 358 N.E.2d at 850, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
31. 84 Misc. 2d 976, 979, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 984 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1975); 52 App. Div.
2d 84, 87, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764, 767 (1st Dep't. 1976).
32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 7405 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, ch. 32,
§ 3-20(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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the dissenting opinion in Flushing, which thoroughly discusses the
issues the majority avoided, may provide the needed judicial guid-
ance.3
B. U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey
In U.S. Trust, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
questions of police power and financial emergency dealt with in
Flushing. However, it also considered the major question avoided in
Flushing: the impairment of contracts under the contract clause of
the United States Constitution. The U.S. Trust case concerned rev-
enue bonds whose only security and source of payment were receipts
from operations of the facilities of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey (the "Port Authority"), a political subdivision of
each state.34 Although the Port Authority's "faith and credit" was
pledged as a term of its revenue bonds, the pledge was not that of a
municipality with general taxing power as in Flushing, but rather
that of an authority which only could pledge its specific revenues.
In 1974 the legislatures in New York and New Jersey repealed a
1962 covenant which had been a term securing certain of the Port
Authority's revenue bonds.35 The 1962 covenant forbade the Port
Authority from issuing additional revenue bonds if deficits in its
supposedly self-supporting rail service facilities exceeded permitted
levels.36 The 1962 covenant had protected the security and the
source of payment of the Port Authority's existing revenue bonds by
assuring that there would be sufficient cash reserves available to
pay principal and interest as the bonds matured. 7 By repealing the
33. See text accompanying notes 80-89 infra.
34. The Port Authority was established in 1921 by a bi-state compact between New York
and New Jersey to effectuate a "better co-ordination of the terminal, transportation and other
facilities of commerce in, about and through the port of New York. . . ." 1921 N.J. Laws
ch. 151; 1921 N.Y. Laws, ch. 154. The compact received Congressional approval. 42 Stat. 174
(1921). Effective July 1, 1972, the Port Authority's name was changed to the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey. 1972 N.J. Laws, ch. 69; 1972 N.Y. Laws, ch. 531.
35. 1974 N.J. Laws, ch. 25; 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 993.
36. I.e. 10 percent of the amount in the general reserve fund held for the payment of debt
service on its revenue bonds, or 1 percent of the Port Authority's aggregate bonded debt. 431
U.S. at 11. The purpose for this limitation on operating deficits was "to promote continued
investor confidence in the Authority." 134 N.J. Super. at 178, 338 A.2d at 864.
37. It should be pointed out that the 1962 covenant was entered into at the same time
the Port Authority took over the passenger rail facilities of the deficit-ridden Hudson &
Manhattan Railroad through its wholly-owned subsidiary, the Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corporation ("PATH"). Without the 1962 covenant, had additional revenue bonds been
1977]
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1962 covenant and permitting the Port Authority to issue additional
revenue bonds to finance the cost of constructing new passenger rail
facilities, the New York and New Jersey legislatures partially di-
vested existing bondholders of the protection conferred by the 1962
covenant.
Plaintiffs attacked the repeal of the 1962 covenant by alleging
that it constituted an unlawful impairment of a term of the Port
Authority's obligation under the contract clause. 8 The Port Author-
ity defended the repeal, asserting that the contract clause does
not prohibit a municipality from exercising its police power to mo-
dify its contracts if a public emergency exists and the action is
required to protect the public interest."9 In such a case, the Port
Authority argued, a modification of a term of a contract did not
necessarily impair the bondholders' rights or remedies under their
contract, especially where the modification had only a slight eco-
nomic impact on the total security behind payment of the revenue
bonds.40
The United States Supreme Court, in overruling the decision of
the New Jersey Supreme Court" resolved important issues of consti-
tutional and municipal law which will have a substantial impact on
the security of municipal obligations in the future.
The Court first pointed out that none of the cases relied upon by
the defendants to prove that there was no impairment of creditors'
rights dealt with situations where the state or municipality was one
of the parties to the contract. 2 Where a state enters into an agree-
ment, the Court declared that the contract clause does not require
issued to finance passenger rail services after 1962, it is conceivable that the pre-1962 bond-
holders would have received a smaller return on their investment if default or bankruptcy
had occurred.
38. 431 U.S. at 17.
39. Id. at 28-29. The Port Authority relied on the cases of Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945),
and City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). In the Blaisdell and Hahn cases, the
financial difficulties of the Great Depression created a situation which the Supreme Court
considered an "emergency." It therefore permitted Minnesota and New York to exercise their
reserved police power to protect home owners from defaulting on their mortages by extending
the time for repayment.
40. 431 U.S. at 41-44 (dissenting opinion).
41. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976),
aff'g. 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (1975).
42. 431 U.S. at 22-23.
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adherence to an undertaking which surrenders essential attributes
of its sovereignty, such as the police power and the power of eminent
domain."
The Court next observed that the Port Authority had not con-
tracted with the bondholders pursuant to its police power." Rather,
the contract had been made under its spending and borrowing pow-
ers, which, unlike some other governmental powers, could be en-
tirely bargained away." Once the Port Authority had entered into
a financial obligation, such as the terms securing payment of the
revenue bonds, its spending and borrowing powers had been surren-
dered, and the monies in the trustee's general reserve fund set aside
under the 1962 covenant could be used for payment of debt service
and nothing else.4" The exercise of the New York and New Jersey
legislatures' reserved police power to affect a financial agreement
was simply inapplicable in this case. It could not be used to modify
the terms of the Port Authority's obligations to the bondholders.,,
Despite the inefficacy of the police power, the Court proposed a
new test. An impairment of a contract may be constitutional if it is
both "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public pur-
pose."" However, the standard of reasonableness and necessity can-
not be applied with complete deference to local legislative discre-
tion.4" Where a state or municipality is a contracting party, the
43. Id. at 23-25.
44. The police power is not susceptible to exact definition. Generally, it is the power of
government to regulate in the public interest. Specific actions authorized by the police power
include: (1) regulation of highways, railroads, and motor vehicles, (2) regulation of buildings,
housing, zoning, and urban development, (3) regulation of labor relations, (4) regulation of
health and sanitation, (5) regulation of public markets, trade, and commerce, and (6) regula-
tion of gambling and intoxicating beverages. See generally 6 MCQUILUN MUN. CoRP. ch. 24
(3d ed. 1970).
45. 431 U.S. at 24-25. It is the analysis of the power under which the state or political
subdivision acts that is crucial to the Court's decision. Without considering the Port Author-
ity's contract with its bondholders as a "purely financial" contract entered into under the
taxing, spending, and borrowing powers, there is little in the facts of U.S. Trust to distinguish
it from the earlier case of City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965), and applying the
holding therein.
46. 431 U.S. at 24-25. To reach this conclusion, the Court referred to early 19th century
cases, discussed below, which considered attempted modifications of the municipal taxing
and spending powers in light of the contract clause. See notes 72-77 infra.
47. See generally, 43) U.S. at 21-28.
48. Id. at 25.
49. The usual rule for impairment of contractsbetween private parties is that the court
will only inquire whether the exercise of the police power is reasonable in light of all the
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diminution of its financial obligation might well be in its provincial
self-interest.50 Because repeal of the 1962 covenant was not essential
to alleviate the alleged rail passenger emergency, the Court con-
cluded that the repeal was not necessary.5' It likewise found that the
repeal was not reasonable. Since the alleged emergency was foresee-
able when the 1962 covenant was enacted, the change in conditions
between 1962 and 1974 had not been of such magnitude as to make
the repeal reasonable as one done "in light of changed circum-
stances.""2
In sum, the Supreme Court established the rule in the U.S. Trust
case that once a debt obligation is incurred under the spending and
borrowing powers, the municipality may not impair or repudiate it
in any way, unless it is absolutely reasonable and necessary to serve
a legitimate and important public purpose such as the alleviation
of a true emergency.
III. Flushing and U.S. Trust Compared
A. The Police Power and the Impairment of Contracts
The Flushing case and the U.S. Trust case both illustrate new
limitations on the exercise of a state's reserved police power to con-
travene contracts established under other governmental powers.
While the police power is generally thought to be vested perpetually
in the state or municipality to protect its vital interests, the exercise
of the power is now clearly limited by constitutional provisions
* which preserve the terms of existing contracts between a govern-
mental unit and its debt obligation creditors.
While the contract clause had usually been applied in cases in-
volving only private parties, it had long been suggested that the
circumstances. Its actions will not ordinarily be subject to judicial interference. Manigault
v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480-81 (1905).
50. Thus, the U.S. Trust case observed more stringent standards in determining the
reasonableness and necessity of legislative actions impairing a contract to which a state or
municipality is a party. The authority for their reasoning is derived from the case of Perry v.
United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), which involved U.S. government obligations. In that case,
the Supreme Court stated: "There is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress
to control or interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise
of its constitutional authority, and the power of the Congress to alter or repudiate the sub-
stance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money. Id. at 350-51. (emphasis
added).
51. 431 U.S. at 29-31.
52. Id. at 31-32.
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clause also applied to contracts involving a state or municipality. 3
In U.S. Trust, the Court was faced with the determination of
whether an exercise of the reserved police power impaired a term of
a debt obligation sufficiently to invoke the contract clause's prohibi-
tion.
As a general rule, the courts have attempted to harmonize the
contract clause with the essential reserved powers of the states.5
The Supreme Court set out the basic test to review the exercise of
the police power in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell:
the legislation must be addressed to a legitimate end and the mea-
sures taken must be appropriate and reasonable.5
In an older line of cases, a distinction was made between the
impairment of rights and remedies under a contract." A remedy
might be altered or modified without necessarily impairing the sub-
stantive contractual rights.57 The Supreme Court generally dis-
carded the "right vs. remedy" reasoning in the 1930 Depression era
decisions which sustained laws suspending mortgagees' rights as not
violative of the contract clause." Both the Supreme Court in the
U.S. Trust case and the court of appeals in the Flushing case re-
jected the "right vs. remedy" theory argued by the defendants on
the grounds that the rights conveyed in a contract would be a mere
naked right to litigate without a means to enforce the remedy. 9
The principal exception to the prohibition of the contract clause
against the impairment of financial obligations was carved out in
53. The authority for the proposition that the contract clause applies to contracts with
a state or municipality can be traced to a citation in Home Bldg, & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. at 435-36, to Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 692 (1897).
54. See 290 U.S. at 443.
55. Id. at 438.
56. See, e.g., Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437, 439 (1903); McCullough
v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 104 (1898); Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514, 518 (1882); Edwards v.
Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 601 (1877).
57. 290 U.S. at 434, n.13; Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 300 U.S. 124, 128 (1937).
58. See Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939); Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S.
221 (1941).
59. 40 N.Y.2d at 736, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26; 431 U.S. at 19-21, n.11.
Indeed, in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965), the Supreme Court pointed out
that the decisions dating from Home Building & Loan Ass'n. have not placed critical reliance
on the distinction between obligation and remedy in analyzing the application of the contract
clause. Id. at 506.
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Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell6 and East New
York Savings Bank v. Hahn.' These cases held that the police
power may be invoked to modify the terms of a contract in a period
of financial emergency where the state is acting to protect the vital
interests of its people. Blaisdell, Hahn and their successors" (the
"Moratorium Cases") were cited to the courts in Flushing and U.S.
Trust as precedent for validating the Moratorium Act and the re-
peal of the 1962 covenant. Although the majority in Flushing and
U.S. Trust rejected the Moratorium Cases, they form the basis of
the vigorous dissents in both decisions.
At first glance it is not difficult to understand why the lower
courts in Flushing and U.S. Trust embraced the Moratorium Cases
as precedential. The Moratorium Cases grew out of the period of the
Great Depression. At that time, the laws of several states allowed
suspension of mortgage foreclosures to give financially embarassed
mortgagors time to recoup their losses. In sanctioning the exercise
of the police power to suspend the enforcement of mortgagees'
rights, the courts approved such suspension when (1) it served a
legitimate end, 3 (2) it was temporary rather than permanent,64 and
(3) it did not impair the substantial rights secured by the contract."
The Moratorium Cases found that the state's police power is
never contracted away in a financial obligation between private
parties. It remains an implied condition of every contract;6 and
when certain events occur to trigger the exercise of the power, the
terms of the contract can be modified without resulting in unconsti-
tutional impairment. The only limitation on the exercise of the
power is that it be reasonable. 7
The facts in Flushing and U.S. Trust did not neatly fit into the
60. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
61. 326 U.S. 230 (1954).
62. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942); Veix v.
Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. of Newark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); see also City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
63. I.e. the protection of the public from widespread eviction. See 290 U.S. at 438, 444.
64. Id. at 439; cf. W.B. Worthen v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934). But see Veix v. Sixth
Ward Ass'n., 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
65. See 290 U.S. at 430, quoting from Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 553
(1866); Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124
(1937). But see W.B. Worthen v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935).
66. East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945).
67. 431 U.S. at 22-23.
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scenario from which the Moratorium Cases evolved. First, the con-
tracting parties in both cases included a municipality or political
subdivision of a state rather than a private party. Second, the pow-
ers under which these public bodies contracted with the bondhold-
ers were the spending, borrowing and taxing powers, casting doubt
on the application of the exception carved out in the Moratorium
Cases which permitted the exercise of the police power to impair
contracts of private parties. Third, the event which triggered the
exercise of the police power in the Moratorium Cases was the col-
lapse of the United States' economy during the 1930s. The courts
in the Moratorium Cases correctly characterized this event as a
public emergency as dire as war, flood, and famine. But, as will be
discussed below, the Flushing and US. Trust courts did not con-
sider the events which led to the arguably reasonable and necessary
exercise of the governmental power in those cases to amount to a
public emergency.
Unfortunately, the court of appeals opinion did not emphasize
the factual distinctions between Flushing and the Moratorium
Cases. But these distinctions form the basis of the Supreme
Court's opinion in U.S. Trust that the Moratorium cases were not
controlling. The court of appeals could have arrived at its holding
by addressing these distinctions under a contract clause analysis,
thereby updating the guidelines enunciated in Faitoute on the inter-
play between the reserved police powers and the pledge of "faith
and credit." It declined to do so, concluding that neither courts nor
legislatures exercising their police powers can violate constitutional
mandates of "faith and credit."6 However, the Flushing decision
does put to rest many of the questions regarding the meaning of the
peculiar language of Article VIII, section 2, the "faith and credit"
provision of the New York Constitution. But further analysis of the
contract clause as a prohibition of the impairment of rights of the
holders of municipal debt obligations may be found in the U.S.
Trust case and in the dissent in Flushing.
68. 40 N.Y.2d at 736-37, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
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B. The Police Power versus the Spending, Borrowing and
Taxing Powers
1. The U.S. Trust Opinion
In the U.S. Trust case the Supreme Court initially observed that
the contracting party was a political subdivision of the States of
New York and New Jersey. It then inquired into the specific powers
employed by the Port Authority when it entered into the contract
with its bondholders. By so doing, the focus of the Court's examina-
tion turned away from inquiring whether the police power could be
exercised as an exception to the prohibition of the contract clause,
to an inquiry of whether the police power could be exercised subse-
quent to the creation of contractual rights established under the
spending," borrowing"0 and taxing powers.' By making the latter
inquiry, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of a fact long as-
sumed in the municipal credit market: debt obligations of states
and municipalities are considerably different from unsecured obli-
gations between private parties. While a private party may repu-
diate or modify its debt terms, state and municipal obligations are
generally inalterable, absent creditor consent or bankruptcy of the
governmental entity.
To find the legal relationship between the contract clause and
the powers under which municipal obligations are issued, the Su-
preme Court delved into a number of early cases which had lain
dormant in the reporters. These cases held that once legally author-
ized municipal obligations are outstanding, a legislature cannot
impair the terms protecting creditors' rights to payment when due."
69. The power to spend public revenues is usually statutory, and is often delegated by
the state to its political subdivisions. The spending power includes power to make purchases,
enter into contracts (other than debt obligations), and to pay annual debt service on munici-
pal obligations. It is generally believed that the power to borrow implies the power to spend
from annual appropriations, at least with respect to general obligations where "faith and
credit" is pledged. 15 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 39.17 (3d ed. 1970).
70. The authority giving a state or municipality the power to borrow money is usually
found in a state statute or constitution. See 15 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 43.20 (3d ed. 1970).
The act of borrowing implies the assumption of an absolute obligation to pay principal and
interest on the debt obligation. Thus, a lending of credit under the borrowing power is to be
differentiated from a current budget appropriation under the spending power.
71. The power to levy, assess, and collect taxes (such as income, property, sales and ad
valorem taxes) is authorized by state statutes and constitutions in order that governmental
functions may be performed. 16 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 44.05 (3d ed. 1972).
72. See Scotland County Court v. United States, 140 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1891); Rails County
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These early decisions establish a fundamental rule of the law of
municipal finance: the power to raise taxes or whatever revenues are
pledged for the payment of principal or interest on debt obligations
imposes a trust on the municipality to honor the terms of payment
which cannot be impaired." Strict compliance with the contract
terms is necessary,7" since the bondholders' contract would be
worthless and would represent only abstract rights if the municipal-
ity were free to excuse itself.7" Thus, where the municipality exer-
cises its spending, borrowing or taxing powers, it reserves no power
to amend or modify its contractual obligations incurred thereunder.
What reservation of the police power is possible under these
cases? The Supreme Court provided the answer in Murray v.
Charleston," where it stated that a contract to pay principal and
interest on bonds pledging the taxing power contains no reservation
or restriction of the duty described. Indeed, the Court stated that a
promise to pay with a reserved right "is an absurdity."" Once the
spending, borrowing and taxing power have been bargained away
entirely, a law altering the terms of a contract is a law which impairs
the contractual rights of the bondholders.
On the basis of these early decisions it was not difficult for the
Supreme Court in US. Trust to formulate a general rule that the
reserved police power does not permit a modification of the terms
securing payment under a contract entered into under the munici-
pality's spending, borrowing, and taxing powers. A case allowing a
slight impairment would only be precedent for a later case permit-
ting greater impairment, until the security behind municipal obli-
gations would be so eroded as to diminish substantially their finan-
cial value.7" Indeed, the court of appeals in the Flushing case raised
this point by stating that a law permitting a moratorium on the
payment of the City's short-term notes for three years would only
be authority for a moratorium of a longer duration until the bond-
Court v. United States, 105 U.S. 733, 735-36 (1881); cf. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170,
175-76 (1909); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 305 (1886); Memphis v. United States, 97 U.S.
293, 297-98 (1877); Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 247 (1871).
73. See Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 555 (1866).
74. See Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1877).
75. 71 U.S. at 555.
76. 96 U.S. 432 (1877).
77. Id. at 445.
78. 431 U.S. at 25-26.
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holders' rights to enforce their creditors' remedies became worth-
less."
2. The Flushing Dissent and Impairment of Contracts
Having reviewed the opinion in the U.S. Trust case, it is instruc-
tive to consider the dissenting opinion of Flushing with respect to
the impairment question. The crux of the dissenting opinion is that
the "faith and credit" pledge contained in Article VIII, section 2, of
the New York Constitution was not intended to immunize or insu-
late the entire contract from the valid exercise of the police power."0
The dissent then reasoned that the majority opinion, carried to its
logical conclusion, meant there could be no moratorium laws affect-
ing contracts containing the "faith and credit" pledge."s In large
measure, the dissent in Flushing disregarded the distinctions be-
tween state and municipal powers in favor of an argument pitting
the reserved police power against the New York Constitution. It
argued that the Moratorium Cases, as expressions of "the Nation's
highest court" should be controlling."2
The dissent emphasized that the holdings of the Moratorium
Cases permitting the exercise of the police power to modify con-
tracts in times of public emergency should apply equally to obliga-
tions between the City and the holders of the affected notes. 3 It
based its view on a dictum in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Blaisdell."4 But as discussed above, other Supreme Court cases
which authorized contract impairment under the police power in-
volved contracts between private parties. 5 In light of the holding in
the US. Trust case that the spending, borrowing and taxing powers
are impervious to the exercise of the police power, the dictum in
Blaisdell is clearly wrong when it suggests that municipal obliga-
tions may be impaired by the police power just as those between
private parties.
79. 40 N.Y.2d at 738, 358 N.E.2d at 853, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 27-28.
80. Id. at 748, 358 N.E.2d at 860, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 34 (dissenting opinion).
81. Id. at 749, 358 N.E.2d at 860, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 35 (dissenting opinion).
82. Id. at 755, 358 N.E.2d at 864, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (dissenting opinion).
83. Id. at 749-52, 358 N.E.2d at 860-62, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 35-37 (dissenting opinion).
84. The dictum from Blaisdell states that the reservation of essential attributes of sover-
eignty (e.g. the police power), applies to every contract. 290 U.S. at 435. This could include,
by inference, those containing the "faith and credit" pledge.
85. See text accompanying notes 60-67 supra.
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Nevertheless, relying on the premise that the police power may
be permitted to impair the terms of a municipality's debt obliga-
tions, the dissent argued further that the Moratorium Act should be
sanctioned as constitutional because the New York Legislature
found a financial emergency to exist in the City."5
Finally, perhaps the most fatal flaw in the dissent's argument is
its incorrect view of the "faith and credit" pledge as a mere promise
to pay given when municipal obligations are issued. 7 As the U.S.
Trust case made clear, when debt obligations are issued under the
spending, borrowing and taxing powers, the promise to pay secured
by the "faith and credit" pledge (in the case of a general obligation
bond) or the specific revenues pledge (in the case of a revenue bond)
must continue unaltered throughout the period the debt obligation
is outstanding. These pledges, therefore, express more than a mere
undertaking to exercise taxing and revenue generating powers to
pay debt service. Except for the rule announced in Faitoute,"8 the
exercise of the state's police power cannot diminish the performance
of the payment terms of the contract. The dissent's conclusion that
the legislature may exercise its reserved police power to impair the
performance of payment of the contract is therefore against the
weight of authority. When a financial obligation involves the pledge
of revenues and taxes under the spending, borrowing and taxing
powers, no reserved power remains to be exercised. 9
3. Faitoute v. Asbury Park Distinguished
One cannot discuss the distinction between the various powers of
a state or municipality in the context of U.S. Trust and Flushing
without paying heed to the decision in Faitoute.11 Indeed, the hold-
ing in Faitoute was the source both of the Port Authority's argument
86. 40 N.Y.2d at 754, 358 N.E.2d at 863, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (dissenting opinion).
87. Id. at 745-46, 358 N.E.2d at 858, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 32-33 (dissenting opinion).
88. Id. at 746-47, 358 N.E.2d at 858-59, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 32-33 (dissenting opinion).
89. Of course, the performance of a municipality's general obligations may be modified
under a plan of adjustment under Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-
418 (Cum. Supp. 1977), or possibly under a state bankruptcy proceeding. In Board of Educ.
v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 276, 353 N.E.2d 569, 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657,
661 (1976), the court of appeals pointed out that "[in bankruptcy all obligations may suffer
impairment or dissolution .. " In addition, if an enterprise whose revenues are pledged for
the debt service on revenue bonds, fails or becomes bankrupt, there may be a default on the
payment of interest and principal. See notes 6, 8 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
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that the 1962 covenant could be repealed and of MAC's assertion
that the Moratorium Act was constitutional." After careful consid-
eration, it would appear that Faitoute must simply stand as a
unique case in municipal finance, the result of the existence of
extraordinary circumstances.
When Faitoute was decided, there was no Federal Bankruptcy
Act." Instead, the decision was made under a New Jersey act which
allowed a municipality in financial distress to adjust its debts under
state bankruptcy proceedings. 3 The New Jersey statute permitting
municipal bankruptcy was clearly an exercise of the state's reserved
police power. 4 However, this "bankruptcy power" exception to the
contract clause recognized in Faitoute is distinguishable from
Flushing and U.S. Trust in several important aspects.
The New Jersey statute allowed the refinancing of old debt only
upon consent of holders representing "85 per centum. . in amount
of the indebtedness affected."'" In contrast, neither the Moratorium
Act nor the repeal of the Port Authority's 1962 covenant were sub-
ject to the consent of affected obligation holders. Had such consent
been required and attained," there would have been no impairment.
By accepting the terms of any modification the holders of the af-
fected debt obligations would have waived their objections and have
been estopped from asserting a contract impairment."
91. See 431 U.S. at 27-28; 40 N.Y.2d at 752-53, 358 N.E.2d at 862-63, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 37
(dissenting opinion).
92. The early Municipal Bankruptcy Act (Act of May 24, 1934, §§ 78-80 (repealed 1936))
was declared unconstitutional in Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936). Its
successor, the predecessor of the present Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§
401-418 (Cum. Supp. 1977), was enacted in 1937. Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653. Thus, when
the New Jersey court approved the bankruptcy proceedings of Asbury Park on July 21,
1937, there was no Federal bankruptcy statute in existence. 316 U.S. at 507.
93. 1933 N.J. Laws, ch. 331.
94. This exercise is expressly recognized in the current version of Chapter IX of the
Bankruptcy Act. Section 403 continues to provide that states may enact their own remedies
to adjust municipal debt, 11 U.S.C.A. § 403 (Cum. Supp. 1977), to comply with the holding
of United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938), which required the Federal Bankruptcy Act
to be "carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the sovereignty of the State." Id. at 51.
95. 1933 N.J. Laws, ch. 331.
96. Where debt obligations are held in bearer form, locating the holders of the obligations
to obtain consent is no easy task. This fact is recognized, for example, in Rule 9-7(c) of the
Bankruptcy Rules to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act. This rule permits supplemental
claims of credit to be initiated after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, since all the holders
of bearer obligations would not ordinarily be ascertainable when bankruptcy proceedings are
commenced. 11 U.S.C.A. Rule 9-7(c) (Cumm. Supp. 1977).
97. See 5A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1220 (1964).
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Faitoute acknowledged the existence of a bona fide public emer-
gency in the financial condition of the City of Asbury Park, a fact
which would permit the reasonable exercise of the state's police
power impairing contracts. However, in neither Flushing nor US.
Trust did the respective courts equate the City's financial embar-
assment or the Port Authority's need to raise revenues to finance
passenger rail facilities with the economic emergencies experienced
during the Great Depression, the period from which the Faitoute
case and the Moratorium Cases arose.
Finally, and most important, the result of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in the Faitoute case was a discharge"8 of an old obligation
to pay debt service and the substitution of a new obligation with an
identical security interest but with a longer period for redemption
and a lower interest rate." In Faitoute the Supreme Court found no
impairment of the bondholders' rights and remedies since the new
bonds had the same security as the old ones-the "faith and credit"
pledge of Asbury Park's taxing power."' This is in contrast to the
Moratorium, Flushing and US. Trust cases where the state's action
impaired'01 the old obligation, but did not offer new obligations with
the same security interest.
The discharge versus impairment distinction is crucial to under-
standing why the Faitoute case is not authority for granting legal
sanction to the Moratorium Act or to the repeal of the 1962 covenant
as valid exercises of the police power under the contract clause.
Indeed, the Supreme Court notes the distinction between discharge
and impairment in the US. Trust case. °0 However, similar analysis
is lacking in the dissenting opinion in Flushing and the Faitoute
case is not even cited by the Flushing majority."°3
98. For a discussion of the meaning of "discharge," see generally id. at §§ 1229-31.
99. 316 U.S. at 507. %
100. Id. at 515-16.
101. For a discussion of "impairment," see generally 3 CORBIN, CONTRACrS § 551 (1964).
102. 431 U.S. at 28.
103. However, the court in Flushing pointed out that "those responsible [for the City's
financial difficulties] have made an expedient selection of the temporary noteholders to bear
an extraordinary burden." 40 N.Y.2d at 736, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26. It may
be reasonably inferred that had the Moratorium Act suspended payment of all the City's debt
obligations, the moratorium could have been viewed as a plan of debt adjustment such as
that in the Faitoute case, and similar to the provisions of Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act.
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-418 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In that case, the legislative enactment of the
Moratorium Act could have been held to have been a discharge of the City's old debt obliga-
tions under a bankruptcy statute.
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C. Factual Determinations: Public Emergency versus
Financial Embarrassment
Throughout the litigation in Flushing and U.S. Trust there is a
thinly-veiled controversy regarding characterization of the events
which led to the enactment of the Moratorium Act and to the repeal
of the 1962 covenant. The defendants in both cases considered the
City's financial problems and the need for additional rail passenger
facilities as public emergencies, justifying the exercise of the police
power, on the basis of the precedents set in Faitoute and the Mora-
torium Cases. The courts viewed these facts with less alarm.
In the Flushing case, the court stated it must construe the New
York Constitution strictly and literally, despite the usual rule that
a legislative finding of emergency is entitled to great weight."4 The
court only recognized the City's financial crisis to the extent of
requiring the plaintiffs to wait a period of time for the city to mar-
shall its revenues before the affected noteholders could be paid.'"5
In U.S. Trust, the Supreme Court held that a state cannot refuse
to meet its legitimate financial obligations simply because it would
prefer to promote the public good rather than the private welfare of
its creditors.' 6 It suggested that the Port Authority's financial prob-
lems were foreseeable at the time of the 1962 covenant, and that the
alleged emergency was merely a shift in public policy which would
not justify a modification which diverted revenues set aside for the
payment of the affected revenue bonds.'' Furthermore, since the
Port Authority could raise its tolls and charges, it had other means
of effecting its public policy.' 8 Thus, the Supreme Court found the
104. See Matter of Tuthill, 163 N.Y. 133, 145, 57 N.E. 303, 307 (1900); Matter of Sherrill
v. O'Brien, 188 N.Y. 185, 207, 81 N.E. 124, 131 (1907). The dissent makes much of this point,
and even goes so far as to assert that since the Emergency Clause of the New York Constitu-
tion (Article III, section 25) was enacted after Article VIII, section 2, the latter enactment
"must prevail as the latest expression of the constitutional will of the people." 40 N.Y.2d at
760, 358 N.E.2d at 867, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 42. The majority view was that "[elmergencies and
the police power, although they may modify their applications, do not suspend constitutional
principles." Id. at 740, 358 N.E.2d at 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
105. The court stated: "Plaintiff and other noteholders of the city are entitled to some
judicial relief free of throttling by the moratorium statute, but they are not entitled immedi-
ately to extraordinary or any particular judicial measures unnecessarily disruptive of the
city's delicate financial and economic balance." 40 N.Y.2d at 741, 358 N.E.2d at 855 390
N.Y.S.2d at 29.
106. 431 U.S. at 29.
107. Id. at 29-31.
108. Id. at 30, n.28.
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repeal of the 1962 covenant neither reasonable or necessary as an
exercise justified by emergency conditions.
This judicial disinclination to give full credibility to the cry of
"financial emergency" follows a line of cases which suggests that the
financial embarassment of a municipality is not the type of public
disaster (such as a depression, flood or famine) which permits the
state to exercise its police power in contravention of constitutional
rules to maintain public order, health and safety.'"9 It was, of course,
an extraordinary type of financial emergency amounting to a public
disaster-the Great Depression of the 1930's-which vindicated the
police power in the Moratorium Cases and Faitoute. But neither the
City nor the Port Authority were caught in a national economic
depression. Indeed, it may be more accurate to say that the City
suffered from financial embarassment due largely to its own fiscal
mismanagement,"" while the Port Authority merely attempted to
raise revenues for its capital projects without raising user charges
on its own facilities or reducing its level of "permitted deficits" in
order to issue additional bonds."'
The Court's distinction between traditional public emergencies
and mere financial embarassment is an important judicial develop-
ment in protecting municipal obligations from diminution by the
legislature's police power. A contrary development, allowing per-
missive exercise of the police power and abrogation of Constitu-
tional mandates, would invite the development of a host of creative
"financial emergencies" making a municipal obligation a highly
speculative investment.
109. See Borough of Fort Lee v. United States, 104 F.2d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 1939); Wein v.
State, 39 N.Y.2d 136, 151, 347 N.E.2d 586, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 (1976); Hurd v. City of
Buffalo, 41 App. Div.2d 402, 405, 343 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (4th Dep't 1973), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d
628, 311 N.E.2d 504, 355 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1974).
110. To be sure, the fiscal difficulties of the City are not unique. In recent years large
urban centers have suffered from loss of population and industry resulting in a stagnant tax
base, while at the same time the demands for services have increased. See generally, ADVISORY
COMM'N. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (ACIR), FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL DIMENSION (July 1973). However, as the Securities and Exchange Commission has
recently reported, the fact that the City is now frozen out of the capital markets is a direct
result of City officials having misled the investing public as to its fiscal condition during 1974
and 1975. See STAFF REPORT, S.E.C., TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
(Aug. 26, 1977).
111. 431 U.S. at 29.
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IV. Full Faith and Credit Reconsidered
Having discussed the Flushing and the U.S. Trust cases in the
context of contract impairment, there remains a lingering question
of what the pledge of "faith and credit" means.
In New York, the Flushing case appears to stand for the proposi-
tion that the pledge of "faith and credit" is more than a mere
promise and undertaking to pay principal and interest when due.
It now appears to be a stronger security interest than the good faith
promise to exercise the taxing power, as the Faitoute case suggested,
because the pledge to pay when due creates a lien on all of the
municipality's revenues to pay an installment of principal and in-
terest at the time it becomes due."'
But even these general statements redefining the pledge are per-
haps saying too much. Only five months after the Flushing decision,
the New York Court of Appeals decided Quirk v. Municipal Assis-
tance Corp."3 The Quirk case holds that a legislative diversion of
the City's sales tax and stock transfer tax to secure MAC bonds
does not unconstitutionally impair the contract with the holders
of the City's outstanding debt obligations. The court correctly
distinguished the Flushing case by pointing out that the City never
committed its sales and stock transfer tax revenues to debt obli-
gation holders by pledging its "faith and credit." Such revenues,
the court stated, are only available when the "first lien" of Article
VIII, section 2 becomes operational. Although the court notes that
the diversion of such revenues does not leave the City "stripped of
all sources of revenues, other than the real estate tax. . ."'" the
Quirk case may be a dangerous precedent for permitting other
legislatively-created diversions of a municipality's taxing and reve-
nue generating power which seriously deplete its ability to produce
112. Indeed, an opinion of the New York State Comptroller underlines the "first reve-
nues" rule in stating that where no appropriation is made for payment of obligations falling
due in a fiscal year, Article VIII, section 2, requires that "first revenues thereafter received"
be set aside to pay such obligations. 5 Op. State Comp. 149-50 (1949).
113. 41 N.Y.2d 644, 363 N.E.2d 549, 394 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1977).
114. Id. at 647, 363 N.E.2d at 551, 394 N.Y.2d at 844. With regard to the fact that certain
City revenues are diverted to support debt service on MAC bonds, the court said of the City's
pledge of "faith and credit" on its obligations that "[tihe challenged statute does not, and
could not, alter this obligation . . . Nowhere, however, . . . is there any requirement that
collection of particular taxes be continued." Id. at 647, 363 N.E.2d at 551, 394 N.Y.S.2d at
844.
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sufficient funds to pay principal and interest on outstanding debt
obligations.
In jurisdictions which have a constitutional "faith and credit"
pledge the Flushing case may be an important precedent to avert
legislative diminution of such a pledge by exercise of the police
power, under the general rule that the legislature cannot abridge
constitutional principles. However, in other jurisdictions where the
"faith and credit" pledge exists only by statute,' 5 Flushing's prece-
dential value is questionable since the opinion avoids a discussion
of whether that pledge is susceptible to impairment as an exception
to the prohibition of the contract clause.
The U.S. Trust analysis of the contract clause may be helpful in
preventing abridgement of the "faith and credit" pledge if subse-
quent cases follow the Supreme Court's distinction between those
powers, such as the spending, borrowing and taxing powers, which
can be entirely bargained away and the police power which is always
reserved to the state.
In the meantime, the "faith and credit" pledge, under cases such
as Sacramento Municipal Utility District v. Spink,"I State v.
County of Citrus,"7 and State v. City of Lakeland,"' will continue
to stand for the proposition that only taxes and revenues specifically
pledged for the payment of principal and interest on municipal
obligations can be reached by debt obligation creditors in an ordi-
nary creditor's action. The broader "first revenues" lien in New
York on all revenues of a municipality to pay general obligations
remains a peculiar constitutional rule of New York law, modified to
an extent by the permitted diversions of certain taxes and revenues
in Quirk.
V. Conclusion
Upon reflection, it may seem that the reasoning employed by the
court of appeals in the Flushing case and the Supreme Court in the
U.S. Trust Co. case is somewhat convoluted and is simply a pretext
for arriving at the desired result. Indeed, the appellate division's
opinion in the Flushing case convincingly portrayed the City on the
115. See note 32 supra.
116. 303 P.2d 46 (1956).
117. 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4 (1934).
118. 154 Fla. 137, 16 So.2d 924 (1943).
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brink of financial collapse and the Moratorium Act as merely the
final legislative step in a series of actions to shore up the City's
operating cash for daily municipal service delivery.' 9 Similarly, the
New Jersey Superior Court went into considerable detail to describe
how the state legislatures of New York and New Jersey concluded
that the Port Authority's revenues were more urgently needed for
constructing mass.transit passenger rail service in the City's metro-
politan area.' 0
If one accepts the "financial emergency" theory, then it follows
that the Faitoute case is a clear precedent for the state to exercise
its police powers to abrogate its own obligations in the name of
protecting vital public interests. But such reasoning would have to
ignore the constitutional pledge of "faith and credit" in Flushing,
the impairment versus discharge distinction in U.S. Trust, and the
line of cases which has established the immunity of the spending,
borrowing and taxing powers to alteration by the police power be-
cause of the contract impairment clause of the United States Con-
stitution.
While victories for defendants in Flushing and U.S. Trust would
have diverted public monies to salutory purposes other than pay-
ments to creditors, such victories would certainly have been Pyrrhic.
But for the Faitoute case, the special circumstances of which have
been discussed above, no reported case has been found which plaus-
ibly suggests that the security behind municipal obligations may be
diminished unilaterally to the detriment of obligation holder credi-
tors.'"' Contrary holdings in either Flushing or U.S. Trust would
have established the undesirable rule that the holders of municipal
obligations may be powerless to prevent impairment of payment, of
principal and interest on their investments as competing claims for
use of municipal funds arose. Municipal obligations would have
been transformed from the low risk investments they usually are,
119. 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 86, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (1st Dep't 1976).
120. United States Trust Co. of New York v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 167-76, 338 A.2d
833, 857-63 (1975).
121. It may be that Faitoute should now be relegated to the annotations under
"bankruptcy" rather than those under "faith and credit." But had the Flushing and U.S.
Trust courts wanted to give judicial sanction to the challenged statutes in these two cases,
they could have followed the holding in Faitoute, as the courts below them had done.
[Vol. VI
19771 FLUSHING AND US. TRUST 25
into high risk investments appealing only to speculators in venture
capital.' 2
Although the courts in Flushing and US. Trust applied a heavy
hand to the independence of local governmental entities, they saved
all municipalities from the temptation to tamper with creditors'
rights in their debt obligations and thus from the possible self-
destruction of their credit markets. 2 3 The temptation to tamper
with creditor's rights is not a mere academic notion."4 Severe budg-
etary restraints are now imposed on local governments as revenues
strain to keep up with the mounting increase in municipal expendi-
tures.'25 Report reports of the Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations 6 indicate, for example, that in the past twenty
122. There is some evidence which substantiates this assertion. In April, 1976, the City
of Newburgh, N.Y. sold its general obligation bonds at a coupon interest rate of 7.50 percent.
In May, 1977, the City of Jamestown, N.Y. sold its general obligation bonds at a coupon rate
of 5.10 percent. Both cities are comparably rated by one of the nationally recognized rating
agencies, are of similar population, and are older urban areas surrounded by more prosperous,
expanding suburbs. Yet the timing of the sale of bonds had a tremendous effect on the interest
rate. In April, 1976, the Flushing case was still in litigation in the lower courts and the
municipal bond market was highly wary of New York municipal obligations. By May, 1977,
Flushing had been decided by the New York Court of Appeals, and the bond market had
regained considerable confidence in New York obligations.
123. According to an article which appeared in the November 11, 1977 edition of the Wall
Street Journal, Moody's Investors Service, one of the nationally recognized agencies which
rate the credit-worthiness of municipal obligations, gave the City's forthcoming issue of $200
million in short-term notes a rating of MIG-4, its lowest rating. Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1977, at
25, cols. 2-3. This caused the underwriters to cancel the sale. Among the several reasons given
by Moody's to justify the low rating was the damage caused "by the residual effect of the
city debt moratorium passed by the State Legislature in 1975." N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1977,
at 1, col. 6.
124. The growth in municipal debt financing over the past decade has been impressive.
For example, according to the August 4, 1977 edition of the Daily Bond Buyer, in 1968 total
long-term general obligations issued by all states and municipalities in the United States
exceeded $16 billion in aggregate principal amount. In 1976 the total was nearly $34 billion,
or more than a 100 percent increase. Similarly, the 1968 total long-term revenue obligations
issued by all states in the United States was nearly $7 billion in aggregate principal amount.
In 1976 the total was nearly $17 billion, or almost a 150 percent increase. The Daily Bond
Buyer, August 4, 1977, at 12. cols. 1-5. Thus, -state and municipal debt financing is an
increasingly important segment of total capital formation in the United States.
125. For a good comparison of trends in expenditures and revenues for selected municipal-
ities in the State of New York from 1971 to 1975, see Bond, Municipal Bankruptcy Under
the 1976 Amendments to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1,2,3,5
(1976).
126. The Advisory Commission on Governmental Relations (ACIR) is a commission
established in 1959 to monitor the operation of federal, state and local governments. Its
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years interest payments on debt obligations have been rising faster
than the rate of increase in revenues."7 Furthermore, employment
in the state-local government sector over the past twenty years has
grown faster than in either the Federal government or the private
sector.' From 1957 to 1974 average annual earnings of employees
in local government increased faster than in the private sector and
almost as fast as in the Federal government sector.'29 And while local
government reliance on State and Federal aid has increased sub-
stantially over the past twenty years, 30 the expenditure by state and
local governments of their own funds-much of which are proceeds
of debt obligations-has expanded as a percentage of GNP. 3'
Thus, state and local governments must be viewed as a big busi-
ness facing fiscal problems which require sound management tech-
niques and budgetary planning. The holdings of the Flushing and
U.S. Trust cases have established a preference for creditors' rights
which should sustain the confidence of the investment community
in the credit-worthiness of the fiscally prudent municipality.'32 The
statistics compiled on state and local financial matters are among the most reliable in deter-
mining recent trends in these areas.
127. Between 1954 and 1974, interest on debt obligations of State government increased
from 1.6 to 3.2 percent of their own source revenues. For the same period, the increase for
local government was from 3.9 to 6.3 percent. ACIR, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERAL-
isM, 1976 EDITION 4, 66-67 (June 1976).
128. Between 1955 and 1973, employment at the state-local level increased by 119.5 per-
cent, compared to 17.1 percent at the Federal level, and 35.8 percent in the private sector for
the same period. ACIR TRENDS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM, 1954-1974 2-3, 32-33 (Feb. 1975).
129. Between 1955 and 1973, average annual earnings in the state-local government sector
increased from $3,562 to $9,448, or 165.2 percent, compared to from $3,882 to $8,900, or 129.3
percent in the private sector, and from $4,589 to $12,984, or 182.9 percent in the Federal
government sector. Id. at 3, 34-35.
130. Federal and state aid to local governments have increased from $5.9 billion in 1954
to $68.8 billion in 1976, and represents an increase from 30 percent to 46 percent of all total
local general revenue. ACIR, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM, 1976 EDITION at 3-
4, 52-58.
131. Due largely to increase in the tax burden, State and local government revenues have
risen from 4.9 percent of the GNP in 1945 to 12.4 percent in 1976. ACIR, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM, 1976-1977 EDITION 1,6 (March 1977).
132. The determination of "fiscal prudence" of a state or municipality is now the subject
of disclosure of detailed material economic and financial information about the state or
municipality produced in an "official statement" (a document similar to a prospectus in
private corporate financing). The document is circulated to potential interested bidders in a
public sale and usually prepared as a closing document in connection with a private or
negotiated sale. Indeed, the "era of disclosure" in the municipal finance industry was brought
about largely by the fiscal difficulties of the City which culminated in the Moratorium Act
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state of the law of municipal finance now prohibits diminution of
the security behind municipal obligations in order to satisfy com-
peting claims for public monies or to alleviate a financial crisis.
and the Flushing case. No federal regulations now exist which govern what information is
required for full disclosure, although many states have regulations prescribing minimum
disclosure requirements. In addition the Municipal Finance Officers Association in Decem-
ber, 1976 published "Disclosure Guidelines for Offerings of Securities by State and Local
Governments" which suggests voluntary disclosure guidelines.

